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Abstract
There is now a near consensus among researchers about the destructive consequences
of corruption. In the light of this, measuring corruption has become a global indus-
try. An important and commonly used data source are several large-scale multi-country
projects that survey citizens directly about their perceptions and experiences of corrup-
tion. However, we still know little about the quality of many of these measures. This
paper deploys a large survey experiment to investigate two potential sources of bias in
indicators based on citizens’ perceptions and experiences of corruption, stemming from
political bias and sensitivity bias. First, I draw upon research on economic perceptions
and argue that respondents are likely to respond in a political manner when asked how
they perceive the level of corruption in their country. I test this argument by exper-
imentally priming respondents’ political affiliations before asking for their perception
of corruption. Second, I argue that standard questions probing peoples’ corruption ex-
periences are likely to be subject to sensitivity bias. I test this second argument using
by constructing a list experiment. Overall, the results show strong and predictable
sources of response bias.
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1 Introduction
There is now a near consensus among researchers about the destructive consequences of
corruption1 and the societal benefits of clean government (Bardhan 1997; Holmberg and
Rothstein 2011; Mauro 1995; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Rothstein 2011).
In the light of this, measuring corruption has become a global industry, with leading ac-
tors like Transparency International (TI) spending millions of dollars on the construction of
corruption indicators and the surveying of ordinary citizens’ attitudes to and experiences of
corruption. These measures are nowadays used to estimate the incidence of corruption in
different countries and to research different corruption-related questions in political science
and economics. However, we still know little about the quality of many of these commonly
used measures. This paper aims at investigating two potential sources of bias in frequently
used indicators based on citizens’ perceptions and experiences of corruption, stemming from
political bias and sensitivity bias.
While official statistics might seem like a natural starting point for measuring corruption,
these data are often problematic for this purpose and say more about the independence of
the judiciary than actual levels of corruption in a country (Fisman and Golden 2017; Holmes
2015). Most existing indicators and measures are therefore either perception based or based
on self-reported experiences of corruption. While important corruption measures like TI’s
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)2 are largely based on the (aggregated) perceptions of
business people and country experts, many large-scale multi-country projects survey citizens
directly about their perceptions and experiences of corruption.3 These projects include, for
instance, the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)4 and the Eurobarometer on corruption5.
One big advantage with citizen surveys is that they give individual-level data from ordinary
people around the world. These data can then be used to study important individual-
level research questions like: who gets asked to pay bribes (Mocan 2004; Olken 2009); how
individual corruption perceptions and experiences are related to incumbent support and
vote choice (Gingerich 2009; Klasnja et al. 2016; Xezonakis et al. 2016; Zechmeister and
Zizumbo-Colunga 2013); how individual corruption perceptions and experiences are related
to political legitimacy and support for the democratic system (Anderson and Tverdova 2003;
1Corruption in the World Bank’s definition is “the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private
interests” (Kaufmann et al. 2011, p. 4).
2https://transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
3Unlike corruption surveys based on citizen interviews, expert-based corruption indicators have been
widely discussed and criticized (see Hamilton and Hammer (2018) for an overview of this debate).
4https://transparency.org/research/gcb/overview
5https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/eurobarometer-country-factsheets-attitudes-corruption_
en
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Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014; Seligson 2002). Standard corruption questions are therefore
nowadays incorporated into general surveys like Lapop6, World value survey7, Comparative
Study of Electoral Systems8, and the International Social Survey Programme9. However,
little is known about how people form their perceptions of corruption and to what extent
their reports of encounters with corruption are accurate.
A large body of research has documented reporting bias among survey respondents, where
an individual’s reported perception of some phenomenon might be influenced by factors other
than the actual occurrence of the phenomenon (see Bartels 2002; Berinsky 1999; Tourangeau
and Yan 2007). This paper explores two potential sources of bias in individual reports
on perceptions and experiences of corruption. First, I draw upon research on economic
perceptions and economic voting10, and related research on political bias and motivated
reasoning, and argue that respondents are likely to respond in a political manner when
asked how they perceive corruption in their country. Corruption is an issue that citizens
care deeply about (see Holmes (2015) and World Economic Forum (2017)), and hence an
issue where citizens can be expected to react to information on the basis of prior affect and
political affiliations (see Anduiza et al. (2013) and Fischle (2000)). As a result, we should,
for instance, expect incumbent supporters to in general report a substantially more positive
view of corruption in their country, compared to other groups.
Second, I argue that direct questions about corruption experiences are likely to be sen-
sitive and hence subject to ‘sensitivity bias’ (or, more specifically, ‘social desirability bias’)
(Blair et al. 2018), e.g. a type of response bias where respondents answer questions in a man-
ner that will be viewed favorably by others (Tourangeau and Yan 2007). Research shows
that citizens around the world strongly disapprove of corruption and bribe giving. For in-
stance, data from the World Value Survey show that ‘accepting a bribe’ is viewed as a worse
offense than ‘stealing’ or ‘cheating on taxes’. Corruption is also something that is illegal in
all countries. Even in countries where corruption is very widespread, citizens still view bribe
payments and the misuse of public money as a serious moral wrong that can not be justified
(Persson et al. 2013; Rothstein and Varraich 2017). Therefore, admitting to having been
part of a corrupt transaction is arguably an act of revealing sensitive information and hence
something that is likely to be under-reported. This, in turn, makes estimates of the level of
corruption in society based on experiential surveys likely to be biased.
I test these conjectures with two survey experiments included in a large survey fielded
6https://vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php
7https://worldvaluessurvey.org/
8https://cses.org/
9https://issp.org
10That is, how the state of the economy influences elections (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2003).
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in Romania to over 3000 respondents. The first experiment is designed to randomly make
the political affiliations of one group of respondents more salient before answering questions
about corruption perceptions. The second experiment, deploying a so called ‘list experiment’,
is designed to minimize the likelihood of sensitivity bias among another group of respondents
(Blair and Imai 2012; Glynn 2013). This allows me to evaluate both hypotheses empirically.
The results show strong evidence of different types of response bias with regard to questions
about corruption. First, incumbent supporters systematically report a much more positive
view of corruption in Romania. A simple question order prime - asking about political
affiliation before corruption perceptions - makes this effect almost twice as large, suggesting
that a substantial part of the gap is the result of respondents ‘defending’ and justifying
their political identity. Second, the results suggest that direct questions about corruption
experiences are sensitive and under-reported. For some groups, like women, the under-
reporting is massive, according to the estimates. For this group the true rate of corruption
victimization might be three times as high as the reported rate.
The study makes several contributions to the literature. Research has shown that re-
spondents often show strong political bias with regard to attitudes and perceptions about
the economy. The study shows that questions about corruption exhibit very similar pat-
terns, and that responses to these questions are malleable and susceptible to political bias.
The study also demonstrates that direct questions about corruption experiences need to be
treated like sensitive questions, where different groups show diverging patterns of reporting
bias. These results call into question some conclusions from previous research about who
is most likely to be the victim of corruption. Overall, the results from the study should be
of interest for corruption researchers, designers of surveys, and anti-corruption practitioners
alike.
2 Political bias in surveys
Researchers have long acknowledged that survey responses are sometimes unstable and inac-
curate, and that there are clear psychological incentives to shape responses in certain ways
(Berinsky 1999; Zaller 1992). In particular, research on citizens’ evaluations of the econ-
omy has uncovered strong response biases stemming from the respondent’s political leanings
(Lau et al. 1990; Palmer and Duch 2001; Sears and Lau 1983; Wilcox and Wlezien 1996).
For instance, in a study of British voters Evans and Andersen (2006) show that sociotropic
perceptions of the economy are strongly conditioned by prior opinions of the incumbent
Conservative Party. On the other hand, lagged economic perceptions seem not to influence
incumbent popularity in the same way.
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Why would political affiliation affect how respondents perceive the economy? Campbell
et al. (1960) argued that party identification is a ‘perceptual screen’ that works as a filter
through which economic performance is assessed, and that an individual tends to see what is
favorable to his or her partisan orientation. In this sense, a survey response might reflect a
sort of expressive political ‘cheerleading’ in which respondents express their general affinity
for an incumbent or a political party. The perceptual screen might also affect the perception
of objective reality directly. Beliefs about basic political facts have been shown to be shaped
by political identification to a significant degree, partly due to selective information process-
ing (Taber and Lodge 2006). Survey respondents from different political camps can hence
experience different versions of ‘objective’ reality (Bartels 2002; Gerber and Huber 2010).
Respondents might also reason their way to the conclusion that the economy is doing
better when their preferred party or politician is in power. The theory of motivated reasoning
holds that all reasoning is motivated in the sense that it is driven by specific motives and
goals. Taber and Lodge (2006) argue that these goals often are directional goals (as opposed
to accuracy goals) where individuals apply their reasoning powers in defense of a prior specific
conclusion. Directional goals are thus often defensive of particular identities, attitudes, or
beliefs that are strongly held (Leeper and Slothuus 2014).
In political science the majority of this body of research has focused on political bias in
economic perceptions. Much less is known about how political affiliations might interact with
corruption perceptions. Recent decades have seen a rapid increase in efforts to measure cor-
ruption, both via expert surveys and surveys of the public (Fisman and Golden 2017; Holmes
2015). Many of the survey instruments used in the latter category clearly resemble the in-
struments used to tap into people’s economic perceptions; Klasnja et al. (2016) even adopt
the terms ‘sociotropic’ and ‘egotropic corruption voting’ directly from the economic voting
literature. Several studies use survey measures of corruption perceptions to predict political
attitudes like incumbent support (Klasnja et al. 2016; Xezonakis et al. 2016; Zechmeister
and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013, e.g.), or satisfaction with democracy (Anderson and Tverdova
2003; Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014; Seligson 2002, e.g.). To be able to estimate the effect
of corruption in such a setting it is important that corruption perceptions are (exclusively)
determined exogenously to avoid bias. Hence, we would hope that these perceptions are only
determined determined by external changes in an individual’s environment.
However, recent studies give us reasons to believe that this might not be the case. Anduiza
et al. (2013) show that tolerance for corruption can have a clear political dimension. In a
survey experiment fielded in Spain the authors show that respondents’ judgment of the
seriousness of a political corruption scandal partly is determined by whether the accused
politician belongs to the respondent’s preferred party. The authors argue, in line with the
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literature on economic perceptions, that this is a way for respondents to reduce cognitive
dissonance: by downplaying the importance of corruption when it affects the own party
respondents make the political world more consistent with their political predispositions.
Jerit and Barabas (2012) show that individual-level motivated bias is present on a wide
range of topics, as long as a question has importance or strong political implications.
I argue that corruption perceptions are likely to be such a topic. People view corruption in
society as a question of great importance (Holmes 2015). For instance, when the World Eco-
nomic Forum in 2017 surveyed individuals in 186 countries about the most pressing political
issue ‘government accountability and transparency/corruption’ ranked 1st (World Economic
Forum 2017). About 25% of Europeans say that they are ‘personally affected by corruption
in their daily lives’; the number for countries like Romania, Croatia, and Spain is as high as
60-70% (Eurobarometer 2017). People in countries where corruption is widespread also tend
to associate current levels of perceived corruption with the incumbent government (Klasnja
2015; Klasnja et al. 2016; Xezonakis et al. 2016), and view ‘the fight against corruption’
as one of the priorities that should be most important for political leaders (Holmes 2015).
Incumbent supporters therefore have a ‘preferred world-state’ where corruption levels are de-
creasing (this supports their political leanings), while opposition supporters have incentives
to view the situation as worse (this would be a reason to oust the current incumbent). Voters
who sympathize with the government (for whatever reason), for instance, might therefore
convince themselves that the situation with regard to corruption is more positive than what
is warranted by evidence.
In general, a connection between reported corruption perceptions and incumbent support
can exist for two reasons: (1) the respondent might experience changing corruption levels
in society and adjust his or her support for the incumbent accordingly, (2) the respondent
reports perceived corruption levels that are consistent with his or her political predispositions.
If the latter is true, making political affiliations more salient should affect reported corruption
perceptions, whereas if corruption perceptions are only determined exogenously this should
not be the case. In line with the literature on economic perceptions reviewed above, I argue
that we have reasons to believe that some degree of political bias is present in the reporting
of corruption perceptions. In this sense a respondent’s reported corruption levels can be a
way to defend and justify his or her beliefs about the current incumbent. I choose to focus on
incumbent supporters since this group is relatively easy to define, also in a multiparty system
(I discuss this in more detail below). My first hypothesis can thus be stated as follows:
• H1a. On average, incumbent supporters will report lower perceived levels of corruption
compared to opposition supporters.
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• H1b. Increasing the salience of political affiliations will cause incumbent supporters to
report even lower levels of corruption.
3 Sensitivity bias in surveys
According to Tourangeau and Yan (2007) a survey question is likely to be ‘sensitive’ if it
touches on ‘taboo’ topics, if it induces concerns that the information given will become
known to a third party, or if the question elicits answers that are socially unacceptable or
undesirable. If this is the case the respondent can be expected to give a ‘socially desirable’
answer. That is, an answer that the respondent thinks will be viewed favorably by others,
resulting in under-reporting of ‘undesirable’ attitudes and behavior. Misreporting may reflect
intentional deception, but may also reflect a failure to deeply reflect on the true answer (Blair
et al. 2018). Such sensitivity bias (SB) has been shown to be present on a wide range of
topics based on self-reports, from questions about drug use (Fendrich and Vaughn 1994) to
questions about voter turnout (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010).11
Surveys based on self-reported experiences are also common in corruption research. These
so called ‘experiential surveys’ is one of the most direct methods for gauging the amount of
corruption in society, by simply asking citizens about their experiences of corruption (e.g.“Did
you in the last 12 months have to pay a bribe in any form?”). The method is now widely
deployed by several large organizations in multi-country surveys (Holmes 2015), including,
for instance, the Global Corruption Barometer. Should we expect citizens to truthfully
report their first-hand experiences with corruption and bribery?
One reason that such a direct question about corruption might be sensitive is that cor-
ruption is illegal (in essentially every country in the world) (Fisman and Golden 2017). In
an overview of the research on sensitive questions Krumpal (2013) identifies several studies
reporting substantial SB on topics related to criminal behavior and crime-victimization. Ad-
mitting to having been part of a corrupt exchange (for example, paying a bribe) is to admit
part in an illegal transaction, and in the light of this something that could be considered
sensitive. Even asking about whether an individual has been offered or asked to pay a bribe
should be sensitive, given that an individual in this situation also would be more likely to
actually take part in the transaction in the end.
Corruption is also something that people find morally reprehensible. This is true even
in countries where corruption is ubiquitous (Persson et al. 2013; Rothstein and Varraich
2017). World value survey (WVS) has been asking about people’s attitudes towards bribery
in several waves and respondents all over the world consistently show a very strong distaste
11See Tourangeau and Yan (2007) for an overview of research on sensitive survey questions.
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for corruption. Figure 1 shows data from Romania - one of the most corrupt countries in
Europe - based on the most recent WVS wave for this question. It is clear that there exists a
very strong norm against bribery, even in this context where corruption is widespread: over
80% of respondents say that accepting a bribe can never be justified.
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
Never justifiable Always justifiable
Sh
ar
e
Justifiable: Someone accepting a bribe
Figure 1: Data from Romania, World Value Survey, Wave 6.
Given this norm, it is hence reasonable that people would view admitting to being part of
a corrupt transaction as something that is ‘socially undesirable’ (Tourangeau and Yan 2007).
Still, when asked directly about 18% of Romanians (7% in the whole of EU) report that they
were asked to pay a bribe during the past 12 months by a public official (Eurobarometer
2017, p. 80). This number might of course still be under-reported. For instance, Corstange
(2012) finds that 26% of citizens in Lebanon admit to having sold their vote in 2009, but
estimates (using a list experiment) that the true number is over 50%.
In general, vote-buying can be considered as a similar case to that of corruption expe-
riences: both are illegal transactions that are highly stigmatized by society. Traditionally,
studies on vote-buying have asked direct questions about its occurrence and found limited
evidence. In recent years researchers have acknowledged that such direct questions might
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be sensitive and instead considered more sophisticated survey methods. As a result, several
more recent studies have discovered substantial under-reporting of vote-buying due to SB
(Carkoglu and Aytac 2015; Corstange 2012; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012). Important to
note is that severe under-reporting has been found even for questions asking respondents
whether someone ‘offered’ them to sell their vote - and not only for question asking if they
actually sold their vote. Given these similarities to vote-buying, the illegality of corruption,
and people’s almost unanimous distaste for its occurrence, I argue that we should expect a
similar pattern with regard to reported corruption experiences:
• H2. Reported experiences of bribery are subject to sensitivity bias and hence under-
reported.
4 Research design and methods
4.1 A survey experiment in Romania
To test these hypotheses about political bias (H1) and sensitivity bias (H2) in corruption
reporting I conducted a large survey experiment in Romania. Romania is one of the most
corrupt countries in Europe, where the problem of corruption is very much a current issue.
After the legislative elections of 2016 the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Alliance of
Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) formed the governing coalition. After massive protests in
2017 against a bill that (among other things) would have pardoned officials imprisoned for
bribery offenses (see The New York Times May 4th, 2017), the government resigned and was
replaced by a second iteration of the coalition. After an internal power struggle in PSD a
third iteration of the PSD-ALDE coalition took office in January 2018. Due to the political
turbulence, and partly related to accusations of corruption within the government, the public
support for the coalition decreased over the course of 2018. In the end of 2018 many opinion
polls showed a support of around 35% for the governing coalition.12
Similar situations are not uncommon. Researchers even talk about an incumbency dis-
advantage in many developing democracies, where holding office seems to decrease chances
of reelection. Such an effect has been demonstrated in, for instance, Brazil (Klasnja and
Titunik 2017), India (Uppal 2009), and post-communist Eastern Europe (Roberts 2008).
Klasnja (2015) shows, in a study of Romanian mayors, that one plausible explanation for
this pattern is corruption, where office holders exploit their position to reap private gains
- at the cost of subsequent electoral success. In this sense the turbulent situation during
12See https://pollofpolls.eu/RO
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the past years in Romanian politics is rather typical, making Romania an interesting and
informative case to study.
Similar to many other developing democracies, partisanship has generally been relatively
weak in Romania in the post-communist period (Tatar 2013). This makes the case a relatively
tough test for the political bias hypothesis. Any effects found in a context like this, with
weak partisanship, are likely to be more pronounced in contexts where partisanship is strong.
4.2 Testing the PB hypothesis (H1)
The aim of the study is to assess each hypothesis in turn with two different research de-
signs. To test the political bias hypothesis the design exploits question order effects. With
regard to economic voting researchers have shown that question order effects can be substan-
tial (e.g. Wilcox and Wlezien 1996). Sears and Lau (1983) argue that two such effects are
common: political preferences might be personalized when assessed immediately after the
respondent’s own economic situation has been made salient, or perceptions of the economic
situation might be politicized when assessed immediately after important political prefer-
ences have been made salient. Given my hypotheses in this paper I will focus on the latter.
Questions subsequent to the political questions are hence assumed to exhibit stronger po-
litically biased response patterns since asking the political questions make the respondent’s
political identity more salient. In this sense, the question ordering activates a particular po-
litical ‘frame’ around the corruption questions (Zaller 1992). If my hypothesis about PB is
correct ‘politicizing’ corruption perceptions in this way will significantly affect the response
to these questions.
In this setup, some respondents (the treatment group) were randomly assigned to a ques-
tion ordering where the questions about political preferences were asked right before a specific
corruption question (political prime), while the rest of the respondents (the control group)
were given an ordering where the same corruption question instead was asked before the
political questions. The setup hence randomly increases the salience of political affiliations
for a group of respondents with regard to a specific corruption question.
Following Evans and Andersen (2006) I asked the following political questions: (1) What
political party would you vote for if the national parliamentary election were today? (2)
Please choose one of the following phrases to say how you feel about the current government
of Romania: ‘Strongly against’, ‘Against’, ‘Neither in favor nor against’, ‘In favor’, ‘Strongly
in favor’. Based on these questions I coded respondents as government supporters if they
said that they would vote for one of the parties in the current ruling coalition in Romania
(PSD and ALDE) and answer that they are ‘Neither in favor nor against’, ‘In favor’, or
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‘Strongly in favor’ of the current government in Romania. This way I identify government
supporters in terms of vote intention, but exclude respondents that are explicitly against
the government from the definition. I consider different coding decisions with regard to this
variable below.
To measure corruption perceptions I asked three different questions that are commonly
used in the literature and that are of theoretical interest. The three questions give reasonably
comprehensive picture of how the respondent perceives current corruption in Romania, both
in terms of absolute levels and in terms of recent change. First, I adopted the following ques-
tion (corruption increase), used for instance in the Global Corruption Barometer: In your
opinion, over the last year, has the level of corruption in this country increased, decreased, or
stayed the same? The respondent was given five answer alternatives ranging from ‘increased
a lot’ to ‘decreased a lot’. Second, I asked a commonly used question about the absolute level
of political corruption (corruption in politics): In your opinion, about how many politicians
in Romania are involved in corruption? The question has five answer alternatives ranging
from ‘almost none’ to ‘almost all’. This question is, for example, asked in several waves of
the ISSP survey. Third, I asked how worried respondents are about the consequences of
corruption (corruption worry): In general, how worried are you about the consequences of
corruption for the Romanian society? This is a question similar to the questions asked in
Peiffer (2018). The question taps into how concerned a respondent is about the consequences
of corruption, and hence also how important the issue of corruption is for the respondent.
Four possible answer alternatives were given to the question: ‘not worried at all’, ‘a little wor-
ried’, ‘somewhat worried’, ‘very worried’. Finally, as a point of comparison, I also included
a standard question about economic perceptions (economy worse) (see Evans and Andersen
(2006)): In your opinion, over the last year, would you say that Romania’s economy has
got stronger, weaker, or stayed the same? The five answer alternatives range from ‘got a
lot weaker’ to ‘got a lot stronger’. With this design I am able to compare the treatment
effect on the corruption questions with the (well-established; see the review above) political
bias-effect on the economy question. All outcome questions were coded so that high values
indicate ‘bad’ outcomes; increased corruption, worsened economy, high political corruption,
and high worry about corruption.
To avoid artificially induced correlation between different corruption items, and to re-
tain statistical power, the experiment had the following structure. First, a respondent was
randomly assigned to one of the four corruption/economy questions above. This question
was asked before any questions about political preferences. A couple of questions later in
the survey the respondent was asked the two political preference questions described above,
after which the respondent was randomly assigned to one of the three remaining corrup-
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tion/economy questions. This means that each respondent is part of the control group with
regard to one of the corruption/economy questions, and part of the treatment group with
regard to another of these questions. For each specific corruption/economy question, about
a fourth of the sample was hence assigned to the control group and a fourth was assigned
to the treatment group. The basic structure of the experiment is illustrated and discussed
more in depth in the appendix.
4.3 Modeling corruption perceptions
In general, the causal effect of interest with regard to the corruption/economy questions can
then be estimated with a simple regression model:
yi = β0 + β1xi + β2Ti + δ(xi × Ti) + i (1)
Where yi represents the outcome variable of interest, xi is an indicator variable equal to
1 if a respondent is an incumbent supporter and 0 otherwise, Ti indicates if a respondent is
in the treatment group (Ti = 1) or the control group (Ti = 0), (xi×Ti) is an interaction term
including xi and Ti, and i represents the residual term. The treatment, again, consists of
the intervention of priming respondents with their political preference right before answering
one of the three corruption questions. In the interest of space I simply refer to ‘corruption
perceptions’ as a catch-all term referring to all three questions (change, level, and worry -
coded in the way described above). As per H1a, I expect β1 to be < 0 (on average, incumbent
supporters perceive corruption to be lower) and, as per H1b, I expect δ to be < 0 (the effect
of the prime is negative for incumbent supporters - that is, incumbent supporters report
even lower perceived corruption when their political preference has been made salient). I
consider a confirmation of these expectations for all three corruption outcomes to be strong
evidence in favor of H1a and H1b. I consider a partial confirmation of the expectations
(finding significant results in the expected direction for one or two of the outcomes) to be
somewhat weaker evidence in favor of H1a and H1b.
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To facilitate interpretability and graphing of the results I first estimate equation (1)
using OLS with robust standard errors as the baseline model. Even when the underlying
data-generating process is not linear, OLS can often be a good and surprisingly robust
approximation of the ‘true’ model. Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 34-40) point out that OLS
can be viewed as the ‘best linear approximation’ (in a MMSE-sense) of the true conditional
13The economy outcome will be used as a point of comparison and does not represent a formal hypothesis
to be tested. My expectations here are analogous to those with regard to the corruption variables: I expect
incumbent supporters to report a more positive view of the economy, and I expect these reports to be even
more positive when respondents are primed with their political affiliation.
11
expectation function (E[Yi|Xi]) even when this function is non-linear.
I use robust standard errors to account for potential heteroscedasticity in the model.14
More specifically, I use the HC2-estimator described in Long and Ervin (2000) to compute
the variance-covariance matrix, shown to be a consistent estimator of V ar(βˆ) in the presence
of heteroscedasticity of an unknown form:
HC2 = (X′X)−1X′diag
[
2i
1− hii
]
X(X′X)−1 (2)
where 2i is the residual of observation i and hii is the leverage for the same observation.
Still, given that the outcome variables in this case in fact are ordered categorical variables
I also estimate equation (1) using ordinal logistic regression as a robustness check. The
ordinal logistic regression (OLR) model can be defined in terms of a latent variable model
with y∗ as a latent variable ranging from −∞ to∞. The latent model can then be defined as
y∗i = xiβ + i, where xi is the design matrix and β is a vector of regression coefficients. We
can define the relationship between the latent model and the observed outcomes by dividing
y∗i into J ordinal categories:
yi = m if τm−1 ≤ y∗i < τm for m = 1 to J (3)
where the cutpoints τ1 through τJ−1 are estimated from the data. For the case of an out-
come variable with four categories (numbered from 1 to 4) we get the following relationship:
yi =

1 if τ0 = −∞ ≤ y∗i < τ1
2 if τ1 = τ1 ≤ y∗i < τ2
3 if τ2 = τ2 ≤ y∗i < τ3
4 if τ3 = τ3 ≤ y∗i < τ4 =∞
(4)
We define the extreme categories 1 and J as open-ended intervals with τ0 = −∞ and
τJ =∞ (Long 1997, pp. 114-119).
Since y∗ is latent we cannot estimate its mean and variance directly. However, by as-
suming a specific form of the error distribution we can estimate the regression equation
y∗i = xiβ+ i using Maximum likelihood. For the OLR model we assume that  has a logistic
14This could, for instance, be a result of treatment effect heterogeneity where the variance for the outcome
variable is higher in the treatment group than in the control group.
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distribution15 with a mean of 0 and a variance of pi2/3, which gives the following cdf:
FΛ() =
exp()
1 + exp()
(5)
The probability of a specific observed value can then be computed as:
P (yi = m|xi) = P (τm−1 < xiβ + i ≤ τm) =
P (τm−1 − xiβ < i ≤ τm − xiβ) =
FΛ(τm − xiβ)− FΛ(τm−1 − xiβ)
(6)
where
FΛ(τm − xiβ)− FΛ(τm−1 − xiβ) = exp(τm1 − xiβ)
1 + exp(τm1 − xiβ) −
exp(τm−1 − xiβ)
1 + exp(τm−1 − xiβ) (7)
Another way of stating the same thing is that we are modeling the log of the odds that
an outcome is less than or equal to m versus greater than m, given xi :
ln
(y ≤ m|xi)
(y > m|xi) = τm − xiβ (8)
Important to note is that the model assumes proportional odds in that the β’s are the
same for all values of m. The explanatory variables are hence assumed to exert the same
effect on each cumulative logit, regardless of the cutpoint m.
Assuming that observations are independent, we get the following likelihood function
(Long 1997, p. 124):
L(β, τ |y,X) =
J∏
j=1
∏
yi=j
(F (τj − xiβ)− F (τj−1 − xiβ)) (9)
where
∏
yi=j
indicates multiplying over all cases where the observed y equal j. The log
likelihood function can thus be stated as:
lnL(β, τ |y,X) =
J∑
j=1
∑
yi=j
ln (F (τj − xiβ)− F (τj−1 − xiβ)) (10)
The Maximum likelihood estimates can then be obtained by using numerical optimization
methods (see Long (1997)).
15The most common alternative to the OLR model is the ordinal probit model where  instead is assumed
to be distributed normally with mean 0 and variance 1.
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4.4 Testing the SB hypothesis (H2)
To test the sensitivity bias hypothesis I deploy a list experiment, which was implemented in
the middle of the survey.16 This is a survey method previously used to estimate the prevalence
of sensitive behavior like drug abuse, cheating, and vote buying, where the respondent does
not have to directly disclose any information about the sensitive item (see Glynn (2013)).
The list experiment works by aggregating the sensitive item with a list of non-sensitive items
so that the respondent only has to indicate the number of items that apply and not which
specific items that are true. To implement this design, I asked the respondents to do the
following:
Here is a list with different things that you might have done or experienced during the past 12
months. Please read the list carefully and enter how many of these things that you have done
or experienced. Do not indicate which things, only HOW MANY.
• Attending a work-related meeting;
• Investing money in stocks;
• Being unemployed for more than 9 months;
• Discussing politics with friends or family.
The treatment group was shown the same list but with a fifth item added (the item-order
was randomized for all lists):
• Being asked to pay a bribe to a public official
The design protects the respondents’ privacy since as long as respondents in the treatment
group answer with anything less than “five”, no one directly admits to answering affirmative
to the sensitive question (having been asked to pay bribe). Following the advice in Glynn
(2013) the control items were chosen to be negatively correlated to avoid floor and ceiling
effects (where respondents would select either 0 or all items).
4.5 Modeling responses to the list experiment
As shown by Blair and Imai (2012), if we assume that the addition of the sensitive item does
not alter responses to the control items (no design effect) and that the response for each
sensitive item is truthful (no liars), then randomizing respondents into the treatment and
16The list experiment was always implemented before the political questions. The randomization with
regard to the list experiment was independent of the randomization with regard to the political bias experi-
ment.
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control groups allows the analyst to estimate the proportion affirmative answers for the sen-
sitive item by taking the difference between the average response among the treatment group
and the average response among the control group (i.e. a difference-in-means estimator).17
By asking the sensitive question directly to the control group (who did not receive the
sensitive item on their list) I can also model the amount of sensitivity bias by comparing the
direct question with the estimated proportion of affirmative answers to the sensitive item in
the list experiment. For the direct question I asked: In the past 12 months were you at any
point asked to pay a bribe to a public official? The answer alternatives given were ‘yes’, ‘no’,
and ‘prefer to not answer’. I coded affirmative answers as 1 and other answers as 0.18
For the basic analysis of the list experiment I rely on the linear estimator in Imai (2011),
corresponding to a standard difference-in-means estimator.19 To estimate the overall level
of SB I use the procedure described in Blair and Imai (2012) and compare the predicted
response to the direct question, modeled with a logistic regression model, to the predicted
response to the sensitive item in the list experiment.20 The logistic regression model for the
direct question can be defined in the same way as the OLR model described above, but with
an outcome variable with only two categories. Using the same logic, we can define define
the probability that the outcome variable equals 1 as: P (y = 1|xi) = FΛ(xiβ). This gives
the following log likelihood function (from which we can obtain the Maximum likelihood
estimates with numerical optimization methods):
lnL(β|y,X) =
∑
yi=1
lnFΛ(xiβ) +
∑
yi=0
ln (1− FΛ(xiβ)) (12)
The predicted response to the sensitive item in the list experiment can then be compared
to the response to the direct question (modeled with the logistic regression model) to get an
estimate of the amount of SB. I consider an SB estimate that is positive and statistically
17As stated above, the treatment assignment for the political bias experiment was independent of the
treatment assignment in the list experiment. A respondent can hence be in both treatment groups (for both
experiments), in one treatment group, or in no treatment group.
18The formulation of the sensitive item in the list experiment and the direct bribe question follows the
formulation used in (Eurobarometer 2017). This is the less sensitive version of the question that is commonly
used; the other version asks directly if the respondent have actually paid a bribe. Any estimates of SB found
with regard to the somewhat less sensitive bribe question should therefore arguably be larger for the more
sensitive question.
19The difference-in-means estimator can be written as:
τˆ =
1
N1
N∑
i=1
TiYi − 1
N0
N∑
i=1
(1− Ti)Yi (11)
where τˆ is the estimated proportion affirmative answers to the sensitive item, N1 =
∑N
i=1 Ti is the size of
the treatment group and N0 = N −N1 is the size of the control group.
20The procedure is implemented in the R package list.
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different from 0 to be evidence in favor of H2.
An important limitation of the difference-in-means estimator is that it does not allow
researchers to efficiently estimate multivariate relationships between preferences over the
sensitive item and respondents’ characteristics. Researchers may apply this estimator to
various subsets of the data and compare the results, but such an approach is inefficient and
is not applicable when the sample size is small or when many covariates must be incorpo-
rated into analysis. To overcome this problem Imai (2011) developed two new multivariate
regression estimators that allows the researcher to model the response to the sensitive item
as a function of respondent characteristics. Imai (2011) uses the fact - shown by Glynn
(2013) - that we can identify the joint distribution of the treatment and control group from
the list experiment, under two assumptions stated above (no liars and no design effects).
To see this, we define all possible respondent types that correspond to a specific answer to
the list experiment. Let Yi(0) denote a respondent’s truthful answer to the J non-sensitive
items, and Zi denote a respondent’s truthful answer to the sensitive item (0 or 1).
21 Each
respondent’s type can thus be categorized by (Yi(0), Zi). Based on the possible answers
to the list experiment we can then define what respondent types that would give a certain
answer. For instance, a respondent belonging to the treatment group (Ti = 1) giving the
answer ‘1’ would be either type (Yi(0) = 1, Zi = 0) or (0,1) (using shorthand notation). A
respondent belonging to the control group (Ti = 0) and answering ‘1’ would be either type
(1,0) or (1,1) - we would however not directly observe the latter type in the data since this
respondent will not have the option of answering affirmatively to the sensitive item. Based
on this we can describe all possible respondent types. Table 1 shows this for a case with 3
control items (shown to the control group) and 1 sensitive item.
Table 1: Possible respondent types in a design with 3 control items
Response Treatment group Control group
Yi Ti = 1 Ti = 0
4 (3,1)
3 (2,1) (3,0) (3,1) (3,0)
2 (1,1) (2,0) (2,1) (2,0)
1 (0,1) (1,0) (1,1) (1,0)
0 (0,0) (0,1) (0,0)
Let piyz be the population proportion (Pr) of each type, such that piyz = Pr(Yi(0) =
y, Zi = z). For y = 0, ..., J and z = 0, 1 we can then identify piyz for each specific y as follows
21Respondents in the control group are hence shown J non-sensitive items, while the respondents in the
treatment group are shown J + 1 items.
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(Blair and Imai 2012):
piy1 = Pr(Yi ≤ y|Ti = 0)− Pr(Yi ≤ y|Ti = 1) (13)
piy0 = Pr(Yi ≤ y|Ti = 1)− Pr(Yi ≤ y − 1|Ti = 0) (14)
First, Imai (2011) develops a nonlinear-least squares (NLS) estimator to model the re-
sponse to the list experiment as a function of respondent characteristics. The estimator can
be defined as:
Yi = f(xi , γ) + Ti × g(xi , δ) + i (15)
Where xi is a matrix with respondent covariates, E[i|xi , Ti = 0], and (γ, δ) is a vector
of unknown parameters. The model thus puts together two potentially nonlinear regression
models where f(xi , γ) represents the conditional expectation of the control items, given the
covariates, and g(xi , δ) represents the expected response to the sensitive item, given the
covariates. The estimates are obtained by minimizing the sum of squared residuals:
(γˆNLS, δˆNLS) = argmin(γ,δ)
N∑
i=1
(Yi − f(xi , γ)− Ti × g(xi , δ))2 (16)
Imai (2011) suggests a two-step procedure to estimate the model where f(xi , γ) first
is fitted to the control group and then g(xi , δ) is fitted to the treatment group using the
response variable Y ∗i = Yi − f(xi , γˆ) where γˆ represents the estimate of γ from the first
stage.22 The functional form of the models has to be specified, but (Blair and Imai 2012)
suggests using logistic regression submodels.23
The NLS model is consistent as long as the functional form is correctly specified. However,
the estimator can be inefficient (since it does not use all information in the joint distribution
specified above). An alternative is to model the joint distribution directly using Maximum
likelihood estimation. Imai (2011) shows how this can be done by modeling the population
proportions of different respondent types:
g(x, δ) = Pr(Zi,J+1 = 1|xi = x) (17)
22In the appendix Imai (2011) shows how to obtain heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for the NLS
model.
23This would imply that f(xi , γ) = J × logit−1(xi ′γ) and g(xi , δ) = logit−1(xi ′δ). See previous section
for a description of the logit function.
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hz(y;x, ψz) = Pr(Yi(0) = y|Zi,J+1 = z,xi = x) (18)
where xi denotes the respondent covariates, y = 0, ..., J and z = 0, 1. Imai (2011) suggests
that both functions can be modeled with, for instance, binomial logistic regression. The
resulting Maximum likelihood function is complex and is described in Imai (2011) where the
author also develops an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to facilitate optimization
of the functions.
The NLS and Maximum likelihood model can hence be used to estimate how affirmative
responses to the sensitive item vary between respondent groups. Previous research has found
that both corruption reports and/or SB in general might vary between different subgroups
(e.g. Eurobarometer 2014, 2017; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Krumpal 2013; Mocan 2004).
Blair et al. (2018) argue that people are not only concerned with how they themselves are
perceived by others, but also how their group is perceived by other groups. So while people in
some groups individually might be more prone to under-report the sensitive item, they might
also under-report to ‘protect’ their group. Given the PB hypothesis, this could for instance
be the case with regard to government supporters: these respondents might under-report to
make supporters of the government look better.
To check for heterogeneity in SB I will perform exploratory analyses with regard to the
following variables (the variables were identified based on previous research): Incumbent
supporter, Gender, University degree, Big city inhabitant, Age, High-income household (top
20% of the distribution in the data set). For the exploratory analyses I will rely on the NLS
and ML estimators described above.
5 Results
After a pilot study was conducted to test the questions in the survey as well as one of the
assumptions underlying the PB experiment (see appendix), the final survey was fielded be-
tween 19th of December 2018 and 24th of January 2019 in collaboration with the public
opinion research company Luc.id24. Before data collection the hypotheses and overall anal-
ysis plan was preregistred at EGAP25. Based on two series of power analyses (see appendix)
the target number of respondents was set to at least 2900. The sample was collected based
on nationally representative quotas on gender, age, and region. 3027 respondents in total
completed the survey. Descriptive statistics for the sample are available in the appendix.
24https://luc.id
25http://egap.org
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5.1 Political bias experiment
I start by evaluating H1 (a and b). The unpopularity of the current government is reflected
in the survey: about 24% of the sample said they would vote for a party in the governing
coalition if the national parliamentary election were today. PSD is still the most popular
party in the sample, but its share of the total vote decreases as many respondents indicated
that they would ‘not vote’. The share true ‘government supporters’ according to the defini-
tion above is smaller, at about 14%. While this group is relatively small it still contains a
large number of respondents given the large overall sample. However, below I also consider
alternative ways of coding the ‘prime variable’ that utilizes the sample in a different way.
The PB hypothesis predicts that government supporters, on average, should have a more
positive view of corruption in Romania, and that this group should report an even more
positive view when primed with their political affiliation. To test this, I estimated equation
(1) for each of the four outcome variables (the three corruption variables + the economy
variable), using OLS. The results are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Regression Results: OLS
Dependent variable:
Corruption increase Worse economy Corruption in politics Corruption worry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government support −0.893∗∗∗ −1.189∗∗∗ −0.614∗∗∗ −0.383∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.110) (0.109) (0.091)
Prime −0.019 0.144∗ 0.019 −0.068
(0.057) (0.061) (0.056) (0.050)
Gov. support x Prime −0.664∗∗∗ −0.471∗∗ −0.382∗ −0.417∗∗
(0.176) (0.158) (0.178) (0.135)
Constant 4.205∗∗∗ 3.943∗∗∗ 4.213∗∗∗ 3.464∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.034)
Observations 1,492 1,510 1,546 1,506
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.172 0.064 0.062
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses (HC2).
The coefficient for Government support shows the baseline difference between government
supporters and others for the control group (holding other variables constant). That is, in
the group that answered the outcome questions before the political questions. The first two
models show the results for the outcomes corruption change and economy change - the two
outcome questions that are the most similar in terms of structure. The results for these
outcomes are also very similar: government supporters in general place themselves about
one category lower (in the direction of less corruption/better economy) than the rest of the
respondents. The corresponding coefficient for the last other two outcomes are somewhat
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smaller, but still highly significant. Overall, this is in line with H1a: Government supporters
report a much less negative view about corruption in Romania in general and say that they
are less worried about the problem.
The interaction effect (Gov. support x Prime) estimates the effect of the ‘political prime’
- e.g. being asked about political affiliation before the corruption questions, rather than the
other way around. As shown in the table, the effect is large. For the corruption increase
outcome the difference between government supporters and others increases from 0.9 in the
control group to about 1.6 ((−0.893) + (−0.664)) in the treatment group. The pattern is,
again, similar to that for the economy worse outcome where the difference increases from 1.2
to 1.7 ((−1.189) + (−0.471)). In both cases are government supporters substantially more
positive (or less negative) to begin with, and become even more positive when randomly
assigned to the political prime.
The last two outcomes show the same pattern: government supporters think corruption
in politics is lower and worry less about corruption, a difference that become significantly
more pronounced with the political prime. In this experimental condition government sup-
porters answer on average about 0.8 to 1 categories lower. To graphically display the results,
predicted responses for all four outcomes are shown in Figure 2.26
In sum, the results provide strong evidence in favor of the PB hypothesis. The estimates
show that reported corruption perceptions differ substantially depending on whether a re-
spondent supports the government or not. Moreover, the experiment shows how a simple
prime (changing the order of the questions) can strongly affect the results and increase the
‘supporter effect’. This is clearly in line with previous research on economic perceptions (as
also shown by the worse economy estimates), and suggests that respondents, to a significant
extent, shape their reported perceptions to align with their stated political affiliation. This
is clear evidence that respondents’ reported corruption perceptions are not simply a reflec-
tion of external circumstances in society. Rather, when increasing the salience of political
affiliations respondents seem to engage in a ‘directional reasoning process’ where they use
their response to the corruption question to substantiate their previously stated political
preferences.
To check the reliability of these results I also estimated models for the same four outcomes
using ordinal logistic regression, to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variables.
The reults are reported in Table 3.
The coefficients in the output unfortunately cannot be interpreted directly. The coef-
ficients represent the change in the natural log of the odds of being in one higher category
26The graph excludes the treatment group for the ‘others’ category to make the graph easier to interpret.
As can be seen in Table 2, this category differs little from the ‘others’ category in the control group.
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Figure 2: Predicted responses based on regression estimates in Table 2.
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Table 3: Regression Results: Ordinal Logistic Regression
Dependent variable:
Corruption increase Worse economy Corruption in politics Corruption worry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government support −0.837∗∗∗ −1.833∗∗∗ −1.245∗∗∗ −0.976∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.194) (0.191) (0.193)
Prime −0.006 0.255∗ 0.099 −0.124
(0.063) (0.103) (0.104) (0.114)
Gov. support x Prime −0.582∗∗∗ −0.814∗∗ −0.461 −0.589∗
(0.163) (0.277) (0.271) (0.262)
Observations 1,492 1,510 1,546 1,506
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
when a given x-variable changes one step (holding other variables constant). This is, again,
a consequence of the fact that we are modeling ln (y≤m|xi )
(y>m|xi ) . For instance, the coefficient for
government support in model (1) is −0.837. This indicates that the odds that government
supporters are in a higher category (which equals saying that corruption has increased) is
57% lower (e−0.837 = 0.43), compared to other respondents. When receiving the prime, the
odds are instead 76% lower (e−0.837−0.582 = 0.24). The general patterns are the same as in the
OLS models, and suggest that the results discussed above with regard to H1 are robust. At
the same time, the effects with regard to the economy outcome are clearly more pronounced
in the OLR model. The prime effect with regard to the corruption in politics outcome is
also no longer statistically significant at the 0.05-level (the p-value is about 0.1), suggesting
that the effect probably is weaker (and more variable) for this outcome.
The appendix includes several additional robustness checks, including alternative cod-
ings of the supporter variable. Among other things, I report estimates where I instead code
political affiliation only based on the variable measuring the respondents’ attitudes towards
the current government (see above). The respondents are coded as either ‘opposing’, being
‘neutral’, or ‘favoring’ the current government.27 These results, reported in full in the ap-
pendix, show the same pattern as the results above, with neutral respondents being more
positive than ‘oppose’ respondents and ‘favoring’ respondents being the most positive. The
prime also has the strongest effect on respondents favoring the government, followed by neu-
tral respondents. The results from this analysis are in many ways more striking than the
results reported above. For instance, for the corruption change outcome when comparing
respondents in the treatment group favoring the government with respondents opposing the
27Where ‘opposing’ corresponds to category 1-2 on the support variable, ‘neutral’ corresponds to category
3, and ‘favoring’ corresponds to category 4-5. The categories were collapsed to make each category sufficiently
large.
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government the total difference is over 2 ((−1.479) + (−0.665)), e.g. more than two full
categories on the 5-point scale. While the robustness checks in general corroborates the
main results, they also show that the ‘prime effect’ for the outcome corruption in politics is
variable and somewhat model dependent.
5.2 List experiment
I now turn to the SB hypothesis. As argued above, it is reasonable to assume that the often
used direct question about bribe experience is sensitive and hence under-reported. Before
proceeding to the analysis I tested for potential violations of the assumptions underlying the
list experiment (no design effects and no liars). Specifically, Blair and Imai (2012) proposes
a test for detecting design effects, e.g. when the inclusion of the sensitive item affects how
respondents answer the control items. The proposed test is based on the calculation of the
proportion of respondent different respondent types (see above). If one of these proportions
would be negative this is a violation of the no design effects assumption, and a sign that the
list experiment did not work as intended. Formally, the null hypothesis of ‘no design effect’
can be stated as:
H0 =
Pr(Yi ≤ y|Ti = 0) ≥ Pr(Yi ≤ y|Ti = 1) ∀ y = 0, ... , J − 1,P r(Yi ≤ y|Ti = 1) ≥ Pr(Yi ≤ y − 1|Ti = 0) ∀ y = 1, ... , J. (19)
The alternative hypothesis is that at least one value of y does not satisfy the inequalities
described under H0. Blair and Imai (2012) derives methods to compute p-values for observed
proportions under the null hypothesis. Importantly, if none of the proportions are estimated
to be negative the null hypothesis will not be rejected. The table below shows the estimated
distribution of respondent types based on the list experiment in the study at hand.
As shown in the table, none of the proportions are estimated to be negative, and we can
conclude that we do not find evidence of any violations of the ‘no design effects’ assumption,
based on the test.
To evaluate H2, I started by estimating the proportion of affirmative responses to the
sensitive item in the list experiment using the basic difference-in-means estimator (Glynn
2013). I then estimated a logistic regression intercept-only model with the responses to the
direct bribe question as the dependent variable. The two estimates show what proportion
of respondents giving an affirmative answer when their privacy is protected (in the list
experiment) vs when their privacy is not protected (the direct question). I also used the
procedure in Blair and Imai (2012) to compute a 95% confidence interval of the difference
between the two estimates. The results are presented in Table 5 and displayed graphically
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Table 4: Respondent Types, Estimated Proportions
Respondent type Est. s.e.
pi(Yi(0) = 0, Zi = 1) 0.007 0.007
pi(Yi(1) = 0, Zi = 1) 0.036 0.016
pi(Yi(2) = 0, Zi = 1) 0.122 0.018
pi(Yi(3) = 0, Zi = 1) 0.076 0.015
pi(Yi(4) = 0, Zi = 1) 0.112 0.008
pi(Yi(0) = 0, Zi = 0) 0.038 0.005
pi(Yi(1) = 0, Zi = 0) 0.192 0.012
pi(Yi(2) = 0, Zi = 0) 0.244 0.017
pi(Yi(3) = 0, Zi = 0) 0.087 0.017
pi(Yi(4) = 0, Zi = 0) 0.086 0.013
in Figure 3.
Table 5: Sensitive Item, Estimates
Proportion 95% CI low 95% CI high
List estimate 0.353 0.264 0.442
Direct estimate 0.190 0.170 0.210
Difference 0.163 0.072 0.254
The direct estimate of 19% ‘yes’ is very close to the reported statistic in the 2017 Euro-
barometer for Romania at about 18% (Eurobarometer 2017). This stand in stark contrast
to the list estimate at over 35%. The difference of more than 16 percentage points is highly
statistically significant. This is clear evidence that respondents under-report the sensitive
item when asked directly and suggests that the true estimate might be 90% higher than the
estimate based on the commonly used bribe question. As noted above, these estimates are
based on the ‘less sensitive’ version of the bribe question (the other version asking if the
respondent actually paid the bribe), and are also based on a survey mode that should be less
likely to elicit SB (online survey).
Voters under-reporting their experiences with corruption is obviously a serious problem
for researchers or organizations trying to estimate the occurrence of bribery based on direct
questions. However, if this sort of measurement error is randomly distributed across the
population it would still be possible to use direct questions to explore the dynamics of
bribery and assess which individuals or groups that are most likely to be asked to pay bribes.
This is for instance done in Mocan (2004). To explore this, I proceeded by considering the
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Figure 3: Comparison of direct estimate vs list estimate. All respondents.
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multivariate regression estimators above, together with the six described covariates. Given
that the ML estimator is based on the specification of the full likelihood function, this
estimator is more sensitive to model miss-specification, compared to the NLS estimator.
Blair et al. (2019) suggests a general specification test, based on Hausman (1978), as a
formal means of comparing, and deciding between, the ML and NLS estimator. The idea is
that if the underlying modeling assumptions are correct the estimators should yield results
that are statistically indistinguishable. In this case the ML estimator will be more efficient.
The test takes the following form:
(θˆML − θˆNLS)′( ̂V(θˆNLS)− ̂V(θˆML))−1(θˆML − θˆNLS)′ ∼ χ2dim(γ)+dim(δ) (20)
where θˆNLS = (γˆNLS, δˆNLS), θˆML = (γˆML, δˆML), and
̂
V(θˆNLS) and
̂
V(θˆML) are their esti-
mated asymptotic variances. The null hypothesis in the test assumes ‘correct model specifi-
cation’, in which case the ML estimator should be preferred.
Depending on the exact model specification (which covariates that were included), the
test yielded significant results on some occasions, with a p-value of less than 0.05. This
suggests that the ML model might not be appropriate to model the data, and that the NLS
estimator is the safer option.
To explore if the extent of under-reporting differs between groups I therefore used the
NLS estimator to model the relationship between different respondent characteristics and
responses to the sensitive item, based on the six specified covariates. I also estimated a logistic
regression model regressing the direct bribe question on the same variables. Comparisons
between the direct estimate and the list estimate based on these models are shown in Figure
4. The Figure displays the results based on the variables government supporter, gender,
and income. In the interest of space, the results for the variables age, city inhabitant, and
education are presented and discussed in the appendix.
Figure 4 reveals interesting differences in under-reporting among different subgroups.
The left-hand graph indicate that government supporters tend to severely under-report the
sensitive item. When asked directly, under 9% of government supporters say that someone
asked them to pay a bribe, compared to the list estimate at 58%. Given the relatively small
size of this group the point estimate from the list experiment needs to be taken with a grain
of salt, given the substantial uncertainty around the estimate.28 The results do suggest,
however, that under-reporting is huge among government supporters. This is completely in
line with both the SB and PB hypothesis: government supporters might under-report the
28It is hence not obvious that this estimate actually is substantially higher than the overall list estimate of
35%. At the same time, the results strongly suggest that the estimate for the direct question is substantially
lower for government supporters.
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Figure 4: Comparison of direct estimate vs list estimate. Different subgroups: Government
supporters, Gender, and Income.
sensitive item to make their group look better (Carkoglu and Aytac (2015) find a similar
pattern with regard to vote buying in Turkey).
It has long been noted that women seem to be less involved in corruption than men. Some
have argued that one reason for this might be that women simple have fewer opportunities
to engage in corrupt activities and that women get asked to pay bribes less often than men
(e.g. Goetz 2007; Mocan 2004). This is also the pattern shown in the direct estimate of
about 13% for women and 21% for men. The list estimates, however, suggest the opposite
pattern; when using the indirect questioning method women seem to be asked for bribes
more often than men. The list estimate for women is over three times as high as the direct
estimate - 43% vs 13%. This result is interesting, given that it goes against what much of
previous research has argued. At this point I can only speculate about the reasons behind
this pattern. One possibility is that women as a group are more affected by sensitivity bias.29
The higher list estimate could reflect the fact that women utilize the health care sector more
than men, and that this sector, according to many estimates, is the sector most permeated
by corruption (see Eurobarometer 2014, 2017).
Finally, Mocan (2004) argues that we should expect income to be positively related to
bribe victimization, given that it should be possible for a rent-seeking official to extract
29This pattern is found in Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012), although the estimates are uncertain.
27
higher bribes from a wealthier individual. This is also the pattern found in the study at
hand. Interestingly, both the list estimate and the direct estimate are substantially higher for
individuals in the top 20% of the income distribution, possibly suggesting a ‘normalization’
of bribe-paying in this group.
Overall, these results provide evidence in favor of the SB hypothesis and suggest not only
that bribe victimization is under-reported in general, but also that under-reporting differs
substantially between different subgroups. As a consequence, researchers and practitioners
should be very cautious in using direct, obtrusive, questions about corruption experiences to
gauge overall levels of corruption and to model the dynamics of bribery based on these ques-
tions. As in the case of male and female respondents, using different questioning techniques
might lead to opposite conclusions.
6 Conclusions
Respondents’ responses to survey questions are constructed and shaped in many different
ways. Research on survey methodology and public opinion has convincingly shown that re-
sponses often are unstable and strongly affected by things like social context, motivated
reasoning, and particular frames (Bartels 2002; Berinsky 1999; Taber and Lodge 2006;
Tourangeau and Yan 2007; Zaller 1992). In this paper I argue that these findings have been
underappreciated by corruption researchers and practitioners using individual-level survey
data. Recent years have seen a steady increase in the availability of different corruption
measures and the use of corruption questions in large multi-country surveys (Fisman and
Golden 2017; Holmes 2015). Many important measures and data sets are based on surveys
directly probing the perceptions and experiences of the general public. The measures have
been of great interest to political scientists and have opened up several new research avenues
with individual-level data. The increase in data availability has not, however, been accom-
panied by sufficient reflection about problems and potential pitfalls with regard to these
survey-based measures.
This paper departs from two potential sources of bias that have been demonstrated in
previous research: political bias and sensitivity bias. As a first test of the prevalence of
these biases in corruption surveys I conducted an original survey experiment fielded to over
3000 respondents in Romania. The survey aimed at testing two specific hypotheses, in two
different experiment, based on these suggested patterns of response bias. The results from
the first experiment provide strong evidence in favor of the political bias hypothesis (H1).
Government supporters report a much more positive view when asked common corruption
questions that, in principle, ask about about the objective state of society (has corruption
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increased? how common is political corruption?). Government supporters also report being
less worried about corruption in general, possibly signaling that they attach less importance
to the issue. Priming these respondents with their political affiliation makes this general
effect even more pronounced. This suggests that corruption reports to a significant extent
might be subject to political motivated reasoning and expressive ‘political cheerleading’.
Researchers should hence be cautious in estimating models with individual-level measures
of corruption perceptions and individual-level political outcomes such as incumbent support
or vote intention. Relationships like these are likely to be affected by strong feedback mecha-
nisms and reversed causality, especially in surveys asking political questions before corruption
questions. The results also show that responses to questions about corruption perceptions in
general are malleable and affected by simple frames. This means, for instance, that corrup-
tion perceptions among the public should be expected to be more polarized along political
lines at times when political affiliations are more salient, for instance during an election
year. From a broader perspective, the results show that political bias can be substantial
even outside of traditionally studied topics like perceptions about unemployment and infla-
tion (Bartels 2002; Gerber and Huber 2010; Jerit and Barabas 2012), and also an important
factor shaping public perceptions in a multiparty system like Romania with traditionally
weak party identification (Tatar 2013).
The results from the second experiment on sensitivity bias strongly suggest that direct
questions about corruption experiences need to be treated as sensitive questions. According
to the results, the direct question both fails to accurately capture the overall occurrence
(which is heavily under-reported), and to capture the dynamics of bribery and which groups
are most likely to be targeted. This is something that anyone who uses this, or a similar
question, needs to take into account. At the same time, direct questions are an important
tool to gauge actual rates of corruption victimization - given that alternatives such as percep-
tions about ‘general levels of corruption’ can be unreliable, as shown in the PB experiment.
Different techniques to unobtrusively ask sensitive questions do exist, out of which the list
experiment is one. In general, these techniques come at the cost of statistical efficiency,
but when bias is large - like in the study at hand - the bias-variance trade-off should come
down in favor of unbiased (or less biased) estimators (Blair et al. 2018). In essence, this
means that researchers will need larger samples and more sophisticated survey designs to
accurately capture sensitive topics like corruption victimization. Fortunately, recent method-
ological developments make many of these techniques more accessible and powerful (Blair
and Imai 2012; Blair et al. 2015, 2019).
The findings in this paper should not be taken as a discouragement of research on cor-
ruption or of efforts to quantify the incidence of corruption. Rather, given the immense
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importance of the topic it is crucial that we scrutinize the methods we use and try to be
cognizant of sources of error and bias. The experiments in this study are only a first step
in pointing out these potential problems. A task for future research is to think more deeply
about when and in what contexts such problems are most likely to be present and which
techniques that best can mitigate them. Other interesting avenues include extending the ex-
periments to political systems with different dynamics than Romania, for instance systems
where party identification is stronger, like Spain. Overall, this study suggests that paying
more attention to issues of response bias is an important part of further advancing the field
of corruption research.
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Appendix A Appendix
A.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 6: Sample Characteristics
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Female respondent 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 3,016
City with over 200,000 inhabitants 0.48 0.50 0 1 3,027
University education 0.56 0.50 0 1 3,027
Age 35.60 11.75 15 110 3,027
Household income (Lei per month) 4,635.31 3,602.14 0.00 20,000.00 2,613
Persons in household 4.16 1.26 1 7 3,027
Note: Some extreme (probably miscoded) outliers were excluded from the ‘Income’ variable.
Table 7: Respondent Attitudes
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Government attitude (5=favoring) 2.09 1.14 1 5 3,027
Government supporter (attitude+party) 0.14 0.34 0 1 3,027
Political interest (4=high) 2.27 0.93 1.00 4.00 2,969
Corruption increase 4.04 1.12 1.00 5.00 1,492
Worse economy 3.82 1.20 1.00 5.00 1,510
Corruption in politics 4.12 1.08 1.00 5.00 1,546
Corruption worry 3.34 0.94 1.00 4.00 1,506
Direct bribe question (1=yes) 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 1,516
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Figure 5: Vote intentions: “What political party would you vote for if the national parliamentary
election were today?”
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A.2 Power analysis
To decide how many respondents I needed in the final survey (the total number of completes)
I conducted two basic power-analyses with simulated data. First, I simulated answers to the
list experiment using a list with 4 control items (modeled as the sum of 4 draws from different
Bernoulli distributions).30 The simulated responses to the sensitive item (the fifth item in
the treatment group) was a random draw from a Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.3. In this
case I assumed that the answer to the direct sensitive question was a random draw from
a Bernoulli distribution with p = 0.2. That is, I assumed that the ‘true’ sensitivity bias
was 0.1, or 10 percentage points. For comparison, this is half of the size of the amount of
sensitivity bias uncovered in Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012), in their study on vote buying.
I then simulated 5000 surveys and calculated the number of times the null hypothesis of
the estimate for the sensitive item being ≤ 0.2 was rejected (using the difference-in-means
estimator). I then repeated this process for different numbers of ‘respondents’. Figure 1
shows the estimated power (the % of the times the null hypothesis was rejected) for different
n.
Next, I simulated data for the political bias hypothesis. I assumed an equal share of
two types of respondents; incumbent supporters and ‘others’. I then randomly assigned all
respondents to either the control group (no political prime) or the treatment group (political
prime). I assumed the following mean values for the different groups (on an ordinal scale
ranging from 0 to 4). Incumbent supporter (control): 1.64, incumbent supporter (treatment):
1.8, ‘others’ (control): 1.56, ‘others’ (treatment): 1.4. These values was chosen to simulate
a ‘small’ effect size of interest (the coefficient δ) of about 0.1 (see Lakens (2013)). Note that
this variable is reverse-coded compared to the variables used in the paper. For each survey
simulation I estimated equation (1) and tested if δ was negative and statistically significant.
Figure 2 shows the estimated power based on these simulations.
Because of the randomization scheme described above I will have 1
4
of the respondents
in the control group and another 1
4
of the respondents in the treatment group with regard
to each specific corruption/economy question. The effective sample for testing H1 is hence
about half the size of the sample for testing H2. Based on these two power-calculations
above 2800-2900 respondents in total should give me enough statistical power to test both
hypotheses. This gives substantial power to detect the main effect in the list experiment (H2
- over 90%), and also plenty of room to conduct sub-group analyses (for instance, splitting
this sample in half still gives me reasonable power to detect an effect of this size). An effective
sample of about 1400 respondents also gives me over 80% power to detect the main effects
30To make the simulation realistic, the parameter p for each Bernoulli distribution was set to correspond
to a ‘reasonable guess’ with regard to the true parameter for each control item (stated above).
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Figure 6: Testing H2: Estimated power for list experiment (different n).
with regard to H1 (given the assumptions stated above).
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A.3 Additional analysis and robustness checks
A.3.1 Political bias experiment
Table 8: Regression Results with Covariates: OLS
Dependent variable:
Corruption increase Worse economy Corruption in politics Corruption worry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Government support −0.863∗∗∗ −1.164∗∗∗ −0.680∗∗∗ −0.393∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.110) (0.116) (0.094)
Prime −0.030 0.150∗ −0.017 −0.042
(0.056) (0.060) (0.051) (0.046)
Gov. support x Prime −0.587∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗ −0.306 −0.467∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.154) (0.180) (0.134)
Female 0.174∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.057) (0.048) (0.044)
City inhabitant −0.123∗ −0.260∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.056) (0.050) (0.044)
University education −0.207∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.057) (0.054) (0.047)
Top 20% income −0.139 −0.103 −0.683∗∗∗ −0.526∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.069) (0.076) (0.062)
Age −0.029∗ 0.006 −0.014 −0.011
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Age2 0.0003 −0.0001 0.0001 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 4.951∗∗∗ 4.040∗∗∗ 4.292∗∗∗ 3.180∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.224) (0.200) (0.217)
Observations 1,486 1,504 1,542 1,500
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.201 0.186 0.203
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses (HC2).
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Table 9: Regression Results (Oppose/Favor Government): OLS
Dependent variable:
Corruption increase Worse economy Corruption in politics Corruption worry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prime (Gov. support: Oppose) 0.063 0.189∗∗ 0.084 −0.035
(0.054) (0.062) (0.067) (0.057)
Gov. support: Neutral −0.765∗∗∗ −0.701∗∗∗ −0.337∗∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.093) (0.085) (0.080)
Gov. support: Favor −1.479∗∗∗ −1.708∗∗∗ −0.535∗∗∗ −0.448∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.098) (0.098) (0.076)
Gov. support: Neutral x Prime −0.181 −0.297∗ −0.194 −0.175
(0.125) (0.126) (0.129) (0.115)
Gov. support: Favor x Prime −0.665∗∗∗ −0.512∗∗∗ −0.504∗∗∗ −0.448∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.148) (0.152) (0.129)
Constant 4.427∗∗∗ 4.180∗∗∗ 4.283∗∗∗ 3.573∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.046) (0.050) (0.039)
Observations 1,492 1,510 1,546 1,506
Adjusted R2 0.337 0.332 0.080 0.103
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses (HC2).
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A.3.2 List experiment
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Figure 8: Comparison of direct estimate vs list estimate. Different subgroups.
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A.4 Question order assumptions and tests
Background
questions
Control1:
Question PB(i)
Treatment1:
Question PB(-i)
Other
questions
Other
questions
Control2:
Prime ⇒
Question PB(-i)
Treatment2:
Prime ⇒
Question PB(i)
Figure 9: Basic structure of PB experiment with regard to PB question i, where i represents a
specific question in the set
PB = {Corruption increase, Economy worse, Corruption in politics, Corruption worry}.
The design with the ‘political prime’, where some respondents answered the corrup-
tion questions after the political questions, assumes that the fact that the control group
answered the corresponding corruption questions a little earlier in the survey did not af-
fect the outcome. The effect of the prime with regard to a specific PB question i is es-
timated by comparing Control1 to Treatment2 (see figure). Formally, we assume that
E[Y (0)|T = 0] = E[Y (0)|T = 1] - that the potential outcomes for untreated observations
on average are the same for respondents assigned to the control and treatment group re-
spectively (see Holland 1986). As part of the pilot study I therefore conducted a test of this
assumption where respondents were first randomized into the ‘corruption in politics’ question
(see above) and then received the ‘economy question’ later in the survey, or the other way
around (I only used two questions to retain power with the small pilot sample). However,
in this version of the survey the randomized political prime was not included. Therefore
if the assumptions stated above holds we should not expect the answer to the questions to
differ depending on whether the question was given earlier or somewhat later in the survey.
I then conducted an independent sample t-test for each question to see if the placement in
the survey itself affected the responses. The results showed no significant differences. Cor-
ruption in politics, difference (earlier − later): t104 = −0.22, p = 0.83. Economy, difference
(earlier − later): t104 = −0.065, p = 0.95. This suggests that the assumption holds up and
that any differences observed in the experiment is due to the political prime.
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